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Abstract
Can an agent deliberating about an action A hold a meaningful credence that she will do
A? ‘No’, say some authors, for ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ (DCOP). Others
disagree, but we argue here that such disagreements are often terminological. We
explain why DCOP holds in a Ramseyian operationalist model of credence, but show
that it is trivial to extend this model so that DCOP fails. We then discuss a model due to
Joyce, and show that Joyce’s rejection of DCOP rests on terminological choices about
terms such as ‘intention’, ‘prediction’, and ‘belief’. Once these choices are in view, they
reveal underlying agreement between Joyce and the DCOP-favouring tradition that
descends from Ramsey. Joyce’s Evidential Autonomy Thesis is effectively DCOP, in
different terminological clothing. Both principles rest on the so-called ‘transparency’
of first-person present-tensed reflection on one’s own mental states.
Keywords Act credence · Deliberation · Prediction · Ramsey · Joyce · Agency ·
Transparency
1 Introduction
Can an agent hold a meaningful credence about a contemplated action, as she delib-
erates? Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she
chooses whether to do A? Following Spohn (1977) and Levi (1989, 1996), some writ-
ers claim that such ‘act credences’ are problematic, or even incoherent—deliberation
crowds out prediction (DCOP), as Levi puts it. Some writers take DCOP to be almost
a platitude;1 others (e.g., Ahmed 2014; Joyce 2002; Rabinowicz 2002) think that the
case for it is weak, or that it is clearly false.
Another recent critic of DCOP is Hájek (2016). In Liu and Price (2018), we argue,
contra Hájek, that DCOP is a special case of the so-called ‘transparency’ of first-person
1
“Probably anyone will find it absurd to assume that someone has subjective probabilities for things which
are under his control and which he can actualize as he pleases” (Spohn 1977, 115).
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present-tensed reflection on one’s own mental state. If someone asks me whether I
believed yesterday that it would rain today, I consider my evidence (e.g., from memory)
about what I believed yesterday. If someone asks me whether I believe that it is raining
now, I don’t consider my present state of belief at all, or at least not directly. I simply
consider whether it is raining. My enquiry ‘looks through’ the question about belief,
to a question about what the belief in question is itself about. This ‘looking through’
is transparency.
Moran (2001) explains transparency in terms of a distinction between two paths to
knowledge of one’s own mental state—a theoretical path, which is the one I use to
discover what I believed yesterday (or what another person believes); and a deliberative
path, where I learn that I now believe that it is raining by asking myself whether it is
raining (and concluding that it is). As we gloss Moran’s conclusion, transparency rests
on the fact that the deliberative path ‘crowds out’ the theoretical path. The practical
case of this is simply DCOP, or so we argue.
Or rather, it is a version of DCOP, for our conclusion comes with a crucial qualifi-
cation. Several of the relevant terms in this debate, including ‘credence’ itself, turn out
to be ill-defined. Hence authors may seem to be disagreeing about DCOP, but simply
be using terms in different ways. We give examples of how this can happen, and how
DCOP may properly be said to fail, if terms are used differently.
In the present paper we apply these two lessons—the prevalence of terminological
disagreements, and the relevance of transparency—to central parts of the literature
about DCOP. We focus in particular on the work of Jim Joyce, who presents himself
as a strong opponent of DCOP (especially as advocated by Levi). We defend two
conclusions. First, Joyce’s disagreement with Levi is essentially terminological. It
turns on the fact that Joyce uses terms such as ‘intention’, ‘prediction’, and ‘belief’
in a different way from Levi and other supporters of DCOP. Second, Joyce himself is
committed to a principle which, like the version of DCOP we defend in Liu and Price
(2018) is a consequence of transparency. Terminological differences aside, Joyce turns
out to be a friend of DCOP, on its most interesting and plausible reading.
Given our terminological concerns, we must be careful not to speak of the DCOP
thesis. There are several theses on offer, varying in what is meant by various crucial
terms, including ‘credence’ itself. With this in mind, we begin with one well-known
framework for understanding credence, the classical subjective decision theory (SDT)
of writers such as Ramsey and Savage. We point out that within this model there
is a clear basis for a DCOP-like thesis. This observation is not new, but it is not as
well-known as it should be, and we don’t know of any previous writers who put its
significance into the broader context that we offer here.2
As we explain, however, there are other models of credence that do admit act
credences. We give a simple example, and then explore a sophisticated model proposed
by Joyce (2002, 2007). Joyce presents himself as an opponent of DCOP. Comparing
Joyce to Ramsey, however, we shall see that the main difference is that Joyce treats as
belief-like some components of the decision process that for Ramsey simply live in a
different box altogether—in the intention box, rather than the belief box. Both sides
2 As we shall see, an additional advantage of starting with Ramsey is that he already has the distinction
between theoretical and deliberative enquiry that is central to Moran’s explication of transparency, and
hence to DCOP understood as a special case of transparency.
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agree that there are such items, and that they can have some of the formal properties
of credences—a degree and a propositional content. The disagreement, to the extent
that there is one, is about whether they deserve to be called ‘beliefs’; and this is largely
a terminological matter. (Joyce agrees with Ramsey that there are no act credences
in Ramsey’s sense during deliberation.) Joyce’s disagreement with Levi has the same
terminological character.
We don’t deny that there is room for argument about the terminological matter in
question (i.e., whether to treat intentions as a special kind of belief). But disagreement
about this matter should not be allowed to obscure a deeper point of agreement between
the two models. This point of agreement is what Joyce terms the Evidential Autonomy
Thesis (EAT): “[A] rational agent, while in the midst of her deliberations, is in a position
to legitimately ignore any evidence she might possess about what she is likely to do,”
(2007, 556–557) as Joyce puts it.
As we shall see, EAT turns out to be more fundamental than DCOP, while embody-
ing much of what recommends DCOP to its proponents. And it, too, turns out to rest on
transparency. We thus offer reconciliation in two senses. Not only is Joyce’s disagree-
ment with DCOP much shallower than he and others have assumed, but there is wide
agreement on a fundamental and closely-related feature of agency—a feature already
on the table in Ramsey, and now well articulated in Moran’s work on transparency.
2 Ramsey’s operational model of credence
Modern subjectivists understand credence, or ‘subjective probability’, in terms of its
role in rational decision making. For our purposes, we want to think of this approach
as providing a functional definition of credence—in effect, credence is treated as a
theoretical notion, which is operationally defined, along with subjective utility, in
terms of its role in producing certain specified choices. The idea of formalising the
notion of credence, or degree of belief, in this way goes back to Frank Ramsey’s
ground-breaking work ‘Truth and Probability’ (Ramsey 1926).3
Ramsey sets out to investigate what he calls “the logic of partial belief,” and to treat
such a logic as the basis for an understanding of probability. He notes a large obstacle
in the path of this project:
It is a common view that belief and other psychological variables are not mea-
surable, and if this is true our inquiry will be vain; and so will the whole theory
of probability conceived as a logic of partial belief; for if the phrase ‘a belief
two-thirds of certainty’ is meaningless, a calculus whose sole object is to enjoin
such beliefs will be meaningless also. Therefore unless we are prepared to give
up the whole thing as a bad job we are bound to hold that beliefs can to some
extent be measured. (166)
3 Different notions of subjective probability appeared earlier in, for instance, the works of Bernoulli (1713),
Laplace (1810), De Morgan (1847) and Borel (1924). However Ramsey is often credited as the first to provide
a systematic account of subjective probability—one of his great contributions being to show that degrees
of belief are a species of probability, so long as the agent concerned satisfies certain coherence constraints.
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But how to measure degrees of belief? Ramsey says that there are two possibilities.
The first, which he dismisses, is that “the degree of a belief is something perceptible
by its owner; for instance that beliefs differ in the intensity of a feeling by which they
are accompanied”. He argues instead for the second possibility: “that the degree of a
belief is a causal property of it, which we can express vaguely as the extent to which
we are prepared to act on it”. This is the idea—a functionalist view of degree of belief,
as we would now call it—that he then proceeds to develop with characteristic alacrity.
In taking this course, Ramsey is guided by what he calls “the old-established way
of measuring a person’s belief,” which is “to propose a bet and see what are the
lowest odds which he will accept.” Ramsey finds this method to be “fundamentally
sound” (barring some deficiencies due to features like diminishing marginal utility
of money, agent’s possible disdain for gambling, etc., which can nonetheless be dealt
with by stipulating a series of postulates in the formal model). More precisely, Ramsey
considers an agent who chooses among gambles of the form
α if p, β if ¬p.
where p is a proposition and α, β are “goods” that the agent values. The gamble is
understood in the usual sense: in accepting this gamble the agent gets α if p is true,
β otherwise. For instance, let p be “The result of next toss of this coin is heads” and
α and β be some monetary rewards (or penalties). An agent who accepts this gamble
gets α if the coin lands heads, β otherwise.
For notational convenience, let us write G(p, α, β) for the gamble that pays α if
p, β if ¬p. In Ramsey’s approach, we think of life as continually presenting us with
options of this kind. As he puts it, his model
is based fundamentally on betting, but this will not seem unreasonable when it
is seen that all our lives we are in a sense betting. Whenever we go to the station
we are betting that a train will really run, and if we had not a sufficient degree of
belief in this we should decline the bet and stay at home. (183, emphasis added)
Agents are thought of as choosing to accept or reject a given bet, or choosing among
different bets, based on their degree of belief, or credence, in p and utilities they assign
to α and β.
The agent is assumed to have preferences among gambles of this form. Then,
provided that this preference relation among gambles satisfies a set of coherence
axioms, the system yields a probability function P and a utility function U (unique up
to a positive linear transformation) such that the “ultimate good” of accepting gamble
G(p, α, β) can be represented by expected utilities, that is:
EU
[
G(p, α, β)
] = P(p)U (α) + (1 − P(p))U (β).
Ramsey’s theory marks the beginning of a long and fruitful development of prob-
abilistic subjectivism, an effort made by generations of writers. Philosophically, this
approach is motivated by the pragmatic thesis that probability is to be understood
in terms of the rational decision making that we, qua real-world agents, strive to
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achieve on a day-to-day basis. Methodologically, it retains at its core Ramsey’s oper-
ationalised model of personal probabilities (credences) and utilities. Mathematically,
it is built with rigorous representation theorems by means of which probabilities can
be numerically defined.4
For our purposes, what matters is that Ramsey’s model gives us an account of what
it is to hold a credence, or degree of confidence, in a particular proposition. The answer,
holistically generated across a space of propositions, in harmony with a simultaneous
definition of utility, consists in a disposition to choose certain gambles in preference
to others.
3 Can Ramsey’s model make sense of act credences?
Ramsey says at one point that the agent is assumed to have “certain opinions about all
propositions” (174). This cannot be quite correct, however, for there is an important
class of propositions to which his model cannot assign non-trivial credences. To see
this, consider an agent whose current options include the following gamble:
A = G(p, α, β).
What would it take, in Ramsey’s system, for this agent to have a credence in whether
she will accept A, as she decides whether or not to do so? The answer is that the agent
would need to include, in her ranked suite of possible actions, gambles of the form:
B = G( I accept A, γ, δ).
For this is the kind of gamble that is relevant to determining whether she has some
particular degree of belief in the proposition that she will accept A.
A gamble of the form of B is quite unproblematic if it is considered as a measure
of the agent’s degree of belief about whether she accepts A on some other occasion (a
future occasion, or even a past occasion, if we allow that the agent may have forgotten
whether she accepted B at some point in the past). But B makes no sense—or at least,
no sense as a measure of credence—as she decides whether to accept A.
Note that in a context in which an agent is considering gamble A, offering her B
simply adds to whatever is already at stake a fixed amount of γ or δ, available to
the agent for certain, depending on whether she accepts A. This may give us some
information about the agent’s psychological state—in the limit, as γ and δ are allowed
to be large enough to dominate other considerations, it certainly tells us whether she
prefers γ to δ, or vice versa (and therefore deprives us of the information that the
choice would otherwise provide about other matters). But it tells us nothing about any
credence on the agent’s part about whether she will do A, as she makes her choice.
To be more precise, consider, for simplicity, the case where the agent has only two
gambles to choose from, namely A = G(p, α, β) and B = G( I accept A, γ, δ) as
4 See Appendix A in Gaifman and Liu (2017) for a brief account of Ramsey’s betting system.
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formulated above.5 Now suppose that the agent’s credence on proposition p is rp and,
for reductio, her credence on ‘I accept A’ is rA. Then, given her options, the possible
consequences the agent may end up with as results of her actions are A & B, ¬A & B,
A & ¬B, and ¬A & ¬B (see the table below, where ‘A & ¬B’ reads “I accept A but
reject B,” and so on.).
Act Utility value
A & B γ + EU (A) = γ + [r pα + (1 − r p)β]
¬A & B δ
A & ¬B EU (A) = r pα + (1 − r p)β
¬A & ¬B status quo
It is plain that, in this case, the decision problem reduces to a simple choice problem
among different consequences of her actions. Then, the agent should just act in a
manner that maximises her gain. But such choices tell us nothing about any credence
on the agent’s part about whether she will do A—the act-credence rA has nothing to
do with the situation.
We could put the point like this. At the heart of Ramsey’s model is a (formalised)
notion of choice. Agents are assumed to have unrestricted access to a range of options—
a range of gambles, each of which they may either accept or decline. Think of this as
like a bank of toggle switches: for each switch, the agent is free to set it either on or
off. The beauty of the model is to choose the gambles so that the resulting pattern of
switch settings reveals the agent’s credences over a range of propositions.
Beautiful as it is, this machinery cannot make sense of an assignment of a credence
concerning one of switch settings. The chosen switch settings are the ‘observables’
of the model, on view to the agent concerned as much as to a third party. Until they
are fixed, the entire model tells us nothing about the theoretical variables it takes to be
underneath (i.e., the agent’s credences and utilities); but once they are fixed, there is
no room in the model for uncertainty about them.
As we saw, the attempt to add a new switch representing a gamble conditional on
one of the existing switch settings simply becomes a new reward for the choice of
that switch setting. In these circumstances the agent’s choice tells us something about
their preferences,6 but nothing new of an epistemic nature. Where agents make their
own truth, choices that would otherwise reflect degrees of uncertainty have no such
significance—and there is simply no substitute, within Ramsey’s model.
It is clear that Ramsey recognised this distinction between epistemic matters, on
the one hand, and practical matters—things that are up to us—on the other. In a later
piece he says this, for example:
When we deliberate about a possible action, we ask ourselves what will happen
if we do this or that. If we give a definite answer of the form ‘If I do p, q will
5 It is easy to see that the following argument can be generalised to be applied to cases with more than two
options.
6 Actually not even that, if the gambles are formulated in terms of goods—i.e., payoffs whose rankings to
the agent are already assumed to be known.
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result,’ this can properly be regarded as a material implication or disjunction
‘Either not-p or q.’ But it differs, of course, from any ordinary disjunction in
that one of its members is not something of which we are trying to discover the
truth, but something it is within our power to make true or false. (Ramsey 1929,
142, emphasis added)
A few lines later, Ramsey again emphasises the non-epistemic character of our relation
to propositions concerning our present options:
Besides definite answers ‘If p, q will result’, we often get ones ‘If p, q might
result’ or ‘q would probably result’. Here the degree of probability is clearly not
a degree of belief in ‘Not-p or q’, but a degree of belief in q given p, which it
is evidently possible to have without a definite degree of belief in p, p not being
an intellectual problem.7 (142, emphasis added)
Finally, Ramsey also notes that the lacuna in the agent’s credences concerns only her
present actions—matters currently ‘up for decision’, as we might say. As his footnote
puts it:
It is possible to take one’s future voluntary action as an intellectual problem:
‘Shall I be able to keep it up?’ But only by dissociating one’s future self. (142)
To summarise, we have shown that there is no room in Ramsey’s model for credences
for currently-contemplated gambles, or actions. In other words, DCOP holds, within
Ramsey’s model, and subject to the restriction to present actions. So, success of a kind
for DCOP, but both qualifications are essential. We have just seen that Ramsey himself
allows ‘remote’ act credences; and, as we shall shortly explain, it is a trivial matter
to extend Ramsey’s model so that it allows present act credences—i.e., so that DCOP
fails completely.8
4 From Ramsey to Joyce
As we saw, the incoherence of act credences in Ramsey’s model is related to the
objection, often cited in favour of DCOP, that there is something deeply problematic
7 For future reference, we note that Ramsey’s distinction between making true and discovering true has
close affinity to themes in the work of David Velleman and Jenann Ismael, among others. Velleman (1989)
holds that agents enjoy ‘epistemic freedom’ with respect to their own actions, and Ismael (2012) that choices
are self-validating epistemic ‘wild cards’. Though they express the idea in slightly different ways—more
on these differences below – Ramsey, Velleman and Ismael seem to have a common intuition in mind. It is
of the essence of choice that it involves a kind of epistemic singularity, a place in which the rules do not
apply in the normal way. We shall return to this thought below, and explore its development by Joyce and
its connection to transparency.
8 Spohn (1977) and Levi (1989) argued that the standard betting interpretation of probability collapses
when it is applied to action-events. Their arguments, which involve revisions of rewards and events in a
bet, have generated heated debates regarding, among other things, what is the “correct” way to apply the
betting interpretation [cf. exchanges on this matter from Levi (2000), Joyce (2002), Rabinowicz (2002),
Levi (2007) and Spohn (2012)]. Gaifman (1999) provides an analysis of self-reference and cyclic reasoning
involved in decision and game theoretic models, and points out that within the classical Bayesian subjective
decision/probability theory, act credences turn on certain conceptual circularities that cannot be rationally
justified (and hence should be barred from this framework, as Gaifman argues).
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about offering an agent bets on her own actions. This objection is discussed in a classic
paper by Rabinowicz (2002), himself an opponent of DCOP. Rabinowicz concedes
that there is some merit to the argument, but suggests that it doesn’t establish as much
as the proponents of DCOP require:9
In those cases when bet offers themselves would influence our probabilities for
the events on which the bets are made, probabilities no longer are translatable
into betting dispositions. This does not mean, however, that probability estimates
are impossible to make in cases like this. The correct conclusion is rather that the
connection between probabilities and betting rates is not as tight as one might
initially be tempted to think. (Rabinowicz 2002, 110)
We agree with Rabinowicz, if we interpret him simply as noting the possibility of
models that extend the Ramsey framework, to allow the existence of act credences in
circumstances in which the original framework does not.10
Indeed, the point is a rather obvious one, for here is a simple way to construct
such an extension. Imagine that our agent carries in his pocket a Personal Digital
Assistant, Siri, who attempts to maintain a dynamic assignment of probabilities to
a range of the agent’s possible future actions.11 Now let our hybrid model use the
agent’s own credences, where available, and Siri’s, where not. This hybrid model can
certainly assign credences to the agent’s presently-contemplated actions—credences
originating in Siri—even though the agent’s own Ramseyian model cannot.
This trivial example makes a serious point. Anyone in these debates who, unlike
us, takes themselves to be discussing DCOP as a thesis about agents simpliciter, rather
than as about agents modelled in some particular way, would do well to ask themselves
what they mean by an ‘agent’. Without a well-motivated restriction of the field, it will
be trivially true that some agents do satisfy DCOP and others do not, so that there is
no general thesis to be had.
Are there non-trivial reasons for entertaining models that modify Ramsey’s frame-
work so as to admit act credences? Certainly, and to illustrate the point we shall
now turn to two motivations offered by Joyce. Joyce is a particularly interesting case,
from our point of view. He is a strong advocate of DCOP-violating models, but he
makes moves within them that have much in common with some of the key insights
of those who favour DCOP. This offers the interesting prospect that we might be
able to identify an important generic feature of agency, common to DCOP-respecting
and DCOP-violating models, and itself of considerably more interest than the choice
between such models. As we shall see, this possibility turns on the fact that Joyce is not
so much extending Ramsey’s model, as in the Siri case, but relabelling it, by treating
9 (Joyce 2002, §3.1) offers a similar response to this argument for DCOP, suggesting that it doesn’t imply
that the act credences are incoherent, “only that they are difficulty to measure.” We discuss Joyce’s arguments
in detail below.
10 We suspect that Rabinowicz has in mind something stronger, namely that such extensions might be
‘more realistic’, or otherwise preferable, but we set aside that difference for now.
11 Siri does this in an attempt to keep her agent out of trouble, and is able to do it effectively because she
has access to the traditional sources of evidence—the agent’s entire history of, for instance, ‘Likes’ and
‘Dislikes’ on Facebook, dinner reservations on Opentable, purchasing history on Amazon, and so on. One
of the challenges for proponents of DCOP is to explain why the agent himself cannot use such information
to generate credences about his own choices, as he makes them—more on this below.
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as ‘belief-like’ some elements that are present in a Ramseyian model, but classified in
a different way.
4.1 Joyce on the role of act credences
Characterising his own version of Causal Decision Theory (CDT), Joyce notes that
it “requires deliberating agents to make predictions about their own actions.” (Joyce
2002, 69) He notes that Levi maintains that such a decision theory is “incoherent
because ‘deliberation crowds out prediction.’” In response, Joyce defends the follow-
ing conclusion:
[T]he ability of a decision maker to adopt beliefs about her own acts during
deliberation is essential to any plausible account of human agency and freedom.
While Levi suggests that a deliberating agent cannot see herself as free with
respect to acts she tries to predict, precisely the reverse is true. Though they
play no part in the rationalization of actions, such beliefs to are essential to the
agent’s understanding of the causal genesis of her behavior. (70)
Joyce thus presents himself as an opponent of DCOP. However, he provides a helpful
summary of arguments in favour of DCOP—as he puts it, “some general worries that
one might have about letting agents assign probabilities to their own acts”:
Worry-1 Allowing act probabilities might make it permissible for agents to use
the fact that they are likely (or unlikely) to perform an act as a reason for per-
forming it.
Worry-2 Allowing act probabilities might destroy the distinction between acts
and states that is central to most decision theories.
Worry-3 Allowing act probabilities “multiplies entities needlessly” by introduc-
ing quantities that play no role in decision making. (79)
In each case, Joyce expresses sympathy for the concern, but argues that DCOP is not
required in order to meet it. Thus:
As to Worry-1, I entirely agree that it is absurd for an agent’s views about
the advisability of performing any act to depend on how likely she takes that
act to be. Reasoning of the form “I am likely (unlikely) to A, so I should A”
is always fallacious. While one might be tempted to forestall it by banishing
act probabilities altogether, this is unnecessary. We run no risk of sanctioning
fallacious reasoning as long as A’s probability does not figure into the calculation
of its own expected utility, or that of any other act. (79–80)
Note that Ramsey’s model does not allow anything other than “banishing act probabil-
ities altogether”, as Joyce puts it here. In effect, Joyce is agreeing that self-referential
gambles—i.e., gambles with descriptions that refer to how likely they themselves are
to be accepted or rejected—are incoherent, and proposing to understand ‘credence’ so
that act credences do not commit us to such gambles. But for Ramsey there is no such
option—credences are defined in terms of gambles, and in the case of act credences
that would require the kind of self-referential gambles that Joyce agrees to be absurd.
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(It is not clear that the absurdity Joyce has in mind is precisely the one we identified
in §3—arguably, it can’t be, for Joyce takes it to obtain even in his non-Ramseyian
models. We return to this issue in §5.)
Similarly, concerning Worry-2, Joyce concludes:
Even if act probabilities do not figure into the calculation of act utilities, they
may have other roles to play in the process of rational decision making. Indeed,
we shall soon see that they do. (80)
Again, concerning a presentation by Levi of the apparent unmeasurability of act cre-
dences within SDT, Joyce says:
It is quite true that the probabilities [an agent] assigns to acts during her deliber-
ations cannot be elicited using wagers in the usual way, but this does not show
that they are incoherent, only that they are difficult to measure. (86–87)
Finally, Joyce makes similar remarks about Worry-3:
As Wolfgang Spohn has long argued, there is no reason to allow act probabilities
in decision theory if we cannot find anything useful for them to do. Given that
they play no role in the evaluation or justification of acts, it would seem that
there is nothing useful for them to do. Why not abolish them? (98)
Joyce responds as follows:
Act probabilities are a kind of epiphenomena in decision theory. Though they do
no real explanatory work, they are tied to things that do. We need act probabil-
ities because (i) we need unconditional subjective probabilities for decisions
about acts to causally explain action (though not to rationalize it), and (ii)
we need Efficacy to explain what it is for an agent to regard acts as being
under her control. Efficacy requires that P(A\dA) = P(¬A\d¬A) = 1, and
so P(A/dA) = P(¬A/d¬A) = 1. One cannot have these latter conditional
probabilities and unconditional probabilities for dA and d¬A without also hav-
ing unconditional probabilities for A and ¬A. Act probabilities are not only
coherent, they are compulsory if we are to adequately explain rational agency.
We cannot outlaw them without jettisoning other subjective probabilities that
are essential ingredients in the causal processes that result in deliberate actions.
When it comes to beliefs about one’s own actions, deliberation does not “crowd
out” prediction; it mandates it! (98–99)
This will take a little unpacking. First, it is important to note that Joyce is distinguishing
between an agent’s decision to do A, written dA, and the act A itself. When he talks of
act probabilities, he means P(A) and P(¬A), not P(dA) and P(d¬A). This is another
potential source of talking at cross purposes—some proponents of DCOP may take it
for granted that the important issue concerns the latter credences, not the former.
Fortunately this distinction doesn’t matter much in this context, because Joyce is
equally committed to the need for unconditional probabilities of both kinds, P(A) and
P(dA). They are connected by the principle Efficacy, which Joyce takes to encode the
idea that the agent takes A to be under her control—if she chooses dA then A results,
and similarly for d¬A and ¬A.
123
Synthese (2020) 197:4365–4386 4375
Let us grant Joyce that, as he puts it here, “Efficacy requires that P(A\dA) =
P(¬A\d¬A) = 1, and so P(A/dA) = P(¬A/d¬A) = 1.”12 It certainly follows that if
we allow unconditional probabilities P(dA) and P(d¬A) then we shall have to allow
P(A) and P(¬A), as well. But why do these conditional claims require unconditional
probabilities in the first place?
We see two possible answers at this point. The first is that the conditional probabili-
ties are defined in terms of unconditional probabilities, so that we cannot have P(A/dA)
and P(¬A/d¬A) without having P(dA) and P(d¬A) as well. This is a very familiar
move, and needs to be mentioned as a motivation for extending Ramseyian SDT to add
unconditional act credences. But it also admits a well-known reply, namely, that there
are other reasons for treating conditional probability as primitive, and not defining it as
the usual ratio of unconditional probabilities. Ramsey himself favoured this approach.
In a passage we quoted above, he refers to one’s “degree of belief in q given p, which
it is evidently possible to have without a definite degree of belief in p” (1929, 142,
and see also his 1926, 180). Later proponents include Renyi (1970), Price (1986b),
Mellor (1993), and Hájek (2003).
Whether or not Joyce has this consideration in mind, his main point is a different
one. He proposes a detailed model of the deliberative process in which the credences
P(dA) and P(d¬A) play a crucial role. As he notes, the model owes much to Velleman.
From Joyce’s point of view the attractions of this model provide the strongest case for
accepting P(dA) and P(d¬A), and hence for rejecting DCOP. Accordingly, we want
to follow Joyce’s explication of the model in some detail. It is crucial to our claim
that (apparent) disagreements about DCOP are obscuring deeper agreement about the
nature of agency.
4.2 Joyce on“evidential autonomy”
Joyce introduces his discussion of the model in question by articulating yet another
concern about act credences:
I am portraying the agent who changes her mind as altering her beliefs about
what she will decide on the basis of no evidence whatever. She goes from being
certain that she has decided on ¬A to being certain that she has decided on
A without learning anything. Can this sort of belief change be rational? By
letting agents assign subjective probabilities to their own acts it seems that we
are also letting them believe whatever they want about them. This means that act
probabilities must be radically unlike other probabilities in that they seem not
to be at all constrained by the believer’s evidence. … This, I suspect, gets us to
what is really bothering people about act probabilities. (2002, 94–95)
12 In Joyce’s notation P(A/B) is the conditional probability of A given B. The backslash in ‘P(A\dA)’
represents what Joyce calls ‘’causal probability’—“it represents [the agent’s] beliefs about what her acts
will causally promote, so that P(S\ A) will exceed P(S\¬A) only if [the agent] believes that A will causally
promote S.” (79)
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In response, Joyce notes first that when an agent
sees herself as a free agent in the matter of A, Efficacy ensures that all of her
evidence about A comes by way of evidence about her decisions. Her justification
for claiming that she will do A will always have the form: “here is such-and-such
evidence that I will decide on A, and (via Efficacy) deciding on it will cause me
to do it.” (95)
As Joyce says, this may seem “to push the problem back from beliefs about acts to
beliefs about decisions.” But he argues that “this is not so”:
An agent’s beliefs about her own decisions have a property that most other beliefs
lack: under the right conditions they are self-fulfilling, so that if the agent has
them then they are true. Understanding this is one of the keys to understanding
human agency and freedom. (95)
Joyce explains this point with reference to Velleman’s notion of epistemic freedom:
According to Velleman, … the believer has a kind of “epistemic freedom” with
respect to self-fulfilling beliefs that she lacks for her other opinions; she can
justifiably believe whatever she wants about them. If she is sure that believing
H will make H true and that believing ¬H will make ¬H true then, no matter
what other evidence she might possess, she is at liberty to believe either H or ¬H
because she knows that whatever opinion she adopts will be warranted by the
evidence she will acquire as a result of adopting it. More generally, any increase
or decrease in her confidence in H provides her with evidence in favor of that
increase or decrease—the stronger a self-fulfilling belief is, the more evidence
one has in its favor. (96)
Like Velleman (1989), Joyce sees this idea of self-fulfilling belief as crucial to a
proper understanding of agency: “Velleman holds, as I do, that agents are epistemically
free with respect to their own decisions and intentions. … [T]he idea that agents are
epistemically free regarding their own decisions is important and entirely correct.”
(96–97)
Finally, Joyce applies these ideas to offer a model of the dynamics of deliberation:
During the course of her deliberations [an agent’s] confidence in “I decide to do
A” will wax or wane in response to information about A’s desirability relative
to her other options (e.g., information about expected utilities). If A and ¬A
seem equally desirable at some point in the process, then she will be equally
confident of dA and d¬A at that time. If further deliberation leads her to see A
as the better option, then her confidence in dA will increase as her confidence
in d¬A decreases. These deliberations will ordinarily cease when [the agent]
is certain of either dA or d¬A, at which point she will have made her decision
about whether or not to perform A by making up her mind what to believe about
dA. (97)
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Joyce notes that while
this process would be nothing more than an exercise in wishful thinking if [the
agent’s] beliefs about dA and d¬A were not self-fulfilling, the fact that they are
ensures that her subjective probability for each proposition increases or decreases
in proportion to the evidence she has in its favor. (97)
He concludes: “This explains how [the agent’s] beliefs about what she will decide can
be both responsive to her preferences and warranted by her evidence at each moment
of her deliberations.” (97)
Joyce returns to these ideas in a later piece (Joyce 2007), and links them to a point
made by writers on both sides of debates between causal and evidential decision theory,
and introduces EAT:
[M]any decision theorists (both evidential and causal) have suggested that free
agents can legitimately ignore evidence about their own acts. Judea Pearl (a
causalist) has written that while “evidential decision theory preaches that one
should never ignore genuine statistical evidence … [but] actions—by their very
definition—render such evidence irrelevant to the decision at hand, for actions
change the probabilities that acts normally obey.” (2000, p. 109) …
Huw Price (an evidentialist) has expressed similar sentiments: “From the agent’s
point of view contemplated actions are always considered to be sui generis,
uncaused by external factors … This amounts to the view that free actions
are treated as probabilistically independent of everything except their effects.”
(1993, p. 261) A view somewhat similar to Price’s can be found in Hitchcock
(1996).
These claims are basically right: a rational agent, while in the midst of her
deliberations, is in a position to legitimately ignore any evidence she might
possess about what she is likely to do. … A deliberating agent who regards
herself as free need not proportion her beliefs about her own acts to the antecedent
evidence that she has for thinking that she will perform them. Let’s call this the
evidential autonomy thesis. (Joyce 2007, 556–557)
Joyce adds a footnote at this point:
It is important to understand that this freedom only extends to propositions that
describe actions about which the agent is currently deliberating, and whose per-
formance she sees as being exclusively a matter of the outcome of her decision. It
does not, for example, apply to acts that will be the result of future deliberations.
(557)
4.3 Comparing Joyce and Ramsey
We are now in a position to appreciate that there are deep similarities between Joyce’s
model and Ramsey’s. Ramsey does not admit credences for dA and d¬A, though with
precisely the same qualification articulated in the footnote from Joyce just quoted:
the restriction only applies in the context of current deliberations. For Ramsey, the
rejection of such credences seems a conceptual matter, as well as a consequence of
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his operational account of credence. The truth of dA and d¬A is simply “not …
an intellectual problem,” as he puts it—“not something of which we are trying to
discover the truth, but something it is within our power to make true or false.” (1929,
142, emphasis added)
In fact, however, only a hair’s breadth separates this view from Joyce’s. Joyce, too,
agrees that the truth of dA and d¬A is not an intellectual problem of the normal sort,
and that these propositions are within our power to make true or false. He simply
represents this special status in a different way. For Joyce, there is a belief during
deliberation, albeit one with a special epistemic status (because it is self-fulfilling).
For Ramsey there is no belief until it is licensed by the formation of an intention (or
volition, as Ramsey himself puts it), either to dA or d¬A—in other words, until after
deliberation. But this is little more than a stylistic preference, at least compared to the
points of agreement.
In particular, the (apparent) disagreement between Ramsey and Joyce reflects a
difference about the use of the term ‘belief’. Ramsey is taking for granted what we
might call an epistemically-grounded conception of belief (and hence of partial belief,
or credence). On this conception, as in the standard Bayesian picture, beliefs and
credences are only acquired, changed, or updated in the light of new evidence—it is
a conceptual truth about beliefs that they are responsive to evidence in this way. One
common correlate of this idea is the thesis that beliefs have ‘world-to-mind direction
of fit’ (see, e.g., Humberstone Humberstone 1992). Nothing counts as a belief unless,
in some appropriately normative sense, it is ‘trying’ to match the world.
Intentions don’t fit this pattern. As Anscombe (1957) famously pointed out, inten-
tions have mind-to-world direction of fit. For Ramsey, then, intentions don’t count as
beliefs, or partial beliefs, or credences. Ramsey will allow that we have beliefs about
our own actions, of course, but they are downstream of intentions. When one forms
the intention to A, one thereby acquires evidence that one will A (at least in normal
cases), and may thereby come to believe that one will A. But the intention itself is not
such a belief, according to this epistemically-grounded conception of belief.
In contrast, Joyce, following Velleman, thinks of the intentions we form when we
deliberate as involving beliefs—reflexive beliefs about what we ourselves will do.13
This is why beliefs about one’s own action are, as Joyce says, “essential” to his model of
deliberation. In Joyce’s model the products of the process of deliberation—gradually-
strengthening intentions to do something—must involve such beliefs. Unlike other
13 Strictly, Joyce takes it that such beliefs are one component of an intention; there is also a desire-like
component. We set aside the latter element of Joyce’s view in this section, for simplicity. We shall also
ignore the fact that like Skyrms (1990), Joyce (2012) offers a stepwise model of decision-making, in
which partially-formed intentions progress towards a full intention. Given that he interprets intentions as
involving beliefs about the contemplated action, these partial intentions are represented as (or as involving)
act credences—hence the core role of act credences in his model. This makes no essential difference to our
argument that Joyce’s disagreement with Levi and Ramsey is terminological, but it does introduce a new
source of potential terminological confusion. We should not mix up deliberation in the sense of the entire
multi-step process with deliberation in the sense of the process at each step whereby the agent updates her
partial intention. As we noted above, Ramsey can quite well allow act credences formed in the light of
formation of an intention. This will introduce act credences into a multi-step process, even if intentions
themselves are not represented as credences. But it won’t touch Ramsey’s distinction between making true
and discovering true, at the locus of the individual steps.
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beliefs, however, these particular beliefs are self-fulfilling and not responsive to evi-
dence of the usual sort—that’s what EAT tells us.
There are two ways to get to Joyce’s view from Ramsey’s. One is to modify the
epistemically-grounded conception of belief to allow a special class of exceptions, a
special class of beliefs whose genesis does not require evidence—namely, the self-
justifying beliefs that Joyce takes to be involved in intentions. The other is to stretch
the notion of evidence just enough to allow that these special beliefs are supported
by evidence after all – self-supported, in effect, by the evidence that they themselves
generate or constitute. Whichever way we stretch our terminology, the principle that
beliefs have world-to-mind direction of fit gets a little bit stretched, too, but again with
the reassurance that these are special cases. Joyce himself is clear that they are special
cases. As he remarks: “act probabilities must be radically unlike other probabilitie.”
(2002, 94)
By way of comparison, here is Jenann Ismael’s negotiation of the same terminolog-
ical boundary, with Wittgenstein in Ramsey’s shoes and Ismael herself in Joyce’s:14
Wittgenstein … thinks that for [one’s own intentions] to count as knowledge,
they would have to be subject to the game of certainty and doubt, and that it would
have to make sense to doubt their truth. And so for him, these cannot count as
genuine knowledge. On the performative model,15 they are still knowledge, but
degenerate because self-fulfilling. Whereas Wittgenstein is suspicious of the idea
of knowledge free of epistemic constraints, the performative model explains it
and uses it to understand how it shapes the first-person/third-person asymmetries
in predictive opinion. Both of us agree that it is wrong to see the sort of certainty
we have about our own beliefs on the model of Cartesian transparency based
in an introspective faculty. But the performative model provides an alternative
that secures the special epistemic status and integrates it neatly with other truth-
bearing discourse without undermining its status as knowledge. (Ismael 2012,
158–159)
In this case, as for Ramsey and Joyce, it is clear that the two views in question are
extremely close, easily mapped from one to the other with small variations in ter-
minology. Some readers may feel that there is an interesting question whether the
Ramsey/Wittgenstein model or the Joyce/Ismael model comes closer to getting the
psychology of decision right, but for our purposes what matters are the similarities.
The crucial point of agreement is that the fact that supports DCOP in Ramsey’s model
– i.e., that in the process of deliberation we come to beliefs about what we will do after
but not before we form our intention—is mirrored under a different name in Joyce’s
picture. For Joyce, it is simply EAT itself, which implies that the beliefs about our own
actions that play a role in intentions are not themselves evidentially ‘downstream’ of
other beliefs.
14 Ismael notes the similarity between her view and Joyce’s: “James Joyce comes to much the same
conclusion …. He writes ‘an agent’s beliefs about her own decisions are self-fulfilling, and that this can be
used to explain away the seeming paradoxical features of act probabilities.’” (Ismael 2012, p. 156)
15 This is Ismael’s label for the view that decisions are self-fulfilling beliefs.
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Whichever model we choose, deliberation crowds out something. For Ramsey, as we
have seen, “making true” crowds out the ordinary evidential process of “discovering
true”. For Joyce it also crowds out the ordinary evidential process of discovering true,
but in favour of an extraordinary process of this kind—a process that is construed as
generating its own evidence for the discovery in question. And EAT holds in both mod-
els, with a similar terminological shift: in Ramsey’s case the products of deliberation
are evidentially autonomous because they are simply the wrong kind of psychological
state to be evidentially constrained. Modulo this terminological difference, the two
models are isomorphic.
Similarly for Joyce’s ‘disagreement’ with Levi: as we saw, Joyce says that “[w]hile
Levi suggests that a deliberating agent cannot see herself as free with respect to acts
she tries to predict, precisely the reverse is true.” (2002, 70) Because Joyce interprets
intentions as involving beliefs, he understands deliberation as a process of coming to
beliefs about what one will do—coming to predict what one will do, in fact. But Levi
would not deny (obviously!) that a free agent can form intentions, and hence ‘try to
predict’ her own actions in Joyce’s sense of term. To make sense of Levi’s claim we
must read him as using ‘predict’ in the more restricted Ramseyian sense, of a credence
based on (non-degenerate) evidence. Levi denies that a deliberating agent can make
prediction in that sense about her contemplated action, and Joyce agrees. (For him
this is EAT, effectively.) Terminological disagreements aside, in other words, Joyce is
not disagreeing with Levi—on the contrary.
4.4 Beyond EAT
To put this irenic diagnosis in context, we want to note that for EAT, as for DCOP,
it is a trivial matter to find models of cognitive systems acting in the world that
do not satisfy this principle. Our Siri-enhanced Ramseyian agent again provides an
example. In that case, Siri does “proportion her beliefs about her [agent’s] acts to the
antecedent evidence that she [Siri] has for thinking that [her agent] will perform them”
(to paraphrase Joyce’s own statement of EAT). So if we think of Siri and her agent as
a kind of composite, extended agent, we do get a formal violation of EAT.
Defenders of EAT are likely to reply that such composites do not deserve to be called
agents (or not just agents—perhaps the addition of Siri produces an extended mind,
one submodule of which is properly called an agent). We have considerable sympathy
for this viewpoint, but have no need to defend it here. We mention the example for
two reasons. First, we want to reiterate our earlier observation that the kind of issues
we have been discussing involve a great deal of model-relativity. It is helpful to think
about one’s terms. But second, we do think it plausible that EAT marks an important
boundary, and take ourselves to be agreeing with both Ramsey and Joyce on this
point.
However, our main claim is that DCOP as such does not mark such a boundary in
these matters. To paraphrase Sayre’s Law, it may be that the reason that debates about
DCOP seem so intractable is that there is nothing of significance at stake.
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5 Why EAT?
Where does EAT itself come from? We want to conclude by proposing an answer:
in a word, transparency. This will reinforce our conclusion that Ramsey and Joyce
are really on the same page, and show what must be denied by anyone who wants
to disagree. We’ll introduce this diagnosis by raising a further puzzle about Joyce’s
view.
5.1 Queries for Joyce
As we saw, Joyce formulates EAT as follows:
A deliberating agent who regards herself as free need not proportion her beliefs
about her own acts to the antecedent evidence that she has for thinking that she
will perform them. (2007, 557)
But why is this so, and precisely when is it so? Compare the case of a coin toss. Imagine
a coin that says ‘The result is Heads’ on one side and ‘The result is Tails’ on the other.
Whichever statement turns out to be visible when the coin is tossed is self-justifying,
but that doesn’t stand in the way of our having evidence about the result in advance, let
alone give us grounds to ignore such evidence, at that point. Is deliberation different,
according to EAT (and Joyce)? In the coin toss, too, we needn’t apportion our beliefs
after the toss to the antecedent evidence, but that isn’t news.
If there is to be something distinctive about the case of free action, not present in
the coin toss case, EAT needs to apply either before the choice, or somehow during
the choice. The latter possibility seems to make most sense, from Joyce’s point of
view. Choice is a matter of adopting a belief about what one will do, in Joyce’s model.
Read this way, EAT tells us that adoption of belief during the process of choice isn’t
constrained by prior evidence. (The coin toss analogy now works in Joyce’s favour.
The statement on display after the toss is entirely justified, even if the antecedent
evidence made it very unlikely.)
But what is Joyce’s view about an agent’s “beliefs about her own acts” at the
beginning of the process of choice? Does she take over credences based on antecedent
evidence about how she will act, or does EAT already rule that out? (When does the
EATing start, as it were?) There may be a clue in Joyce’s remark that act credences
cannot be reasons for acting:
[I]t is absurd for an agent’s views about the advisability of performing any act
to depend on how likely she takes that act to be. Reasoning of the form “I am
likely (unlikely) to A, so I should A” is always fallacious.
On the face of it, this suggests that Joyce allows that an agent can hold act credences
right at the beginning of a deliberation, but thinks that it would be absurd to take
credences as reasons for one’s choice. But why should that be so? Thinking that I am
likely to do A, I choose to do so in order to confirm my own present prediction. That’s
a somewhat ‘self-satisfied’ reason, perhaps, but what makes it absurd?
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It might seem that the absurdity follows from EAT. In virtue of EAT, the beliefs
formed during deliberation cannot be evidentially constrained by prior evidence. Once
I have chosen to A, my reason for thinking that I will A is that I have formed the self-
validating belief that I will A, and prior evidence is irrelevant, at this point.
But this can’t be right diagnosis. When Joyce says that “[r]easoning of the form ‘I
am likely (unlikely) to A, so I should A’ is always fallacious,” he isn’t talking about
an epistemic fallacy, or a mistaken piece of evidential reasoning. Joyce’s remark is
about reasons for acting. Whichever belief I choose (in Joyce’s model), it will be self-
validating, but presumably I can have non-epistemic reasons for choosing one action
rather than another. Joyce’s claim here is that an act credence can’t be a reason of that
non-epistemic sort.
Perhaps EAT is doing the work indirectly? In virtue of EAT, pre-deliberation act
credences are liable to be ‘evidentially unstable’—an unreliable guide to future cre-
dence on the same matter, as it were. EAT ensures that there is no epistemic constraint
that requires that post-choice act credences align with pre-choice act credences. So
treating a pre-deliberative act credence as a reason would be sitting on a stool one
of the legs of which is liable to collapse under your weight—guaranteed to collapse,
perhaps, in the sense that EAT ensures that the pre-choice act credence carries no
authority whatsoever, after the choice is made.
Indeed, if we were to allow pre-choice act credences to be reasons they would be
liable to undermine themselves before the choice ever got to be made. If my pre-
choice credence that I will do A feeds into my decision to do A, then in arriving at
that credence I acquire new evidence relevant to whether I will do A—I learn of a new
reason relevant to my choice. But this is liable to change my pre-choice credence. At
the very least, it means that there is new evidence for me to consider.16
These considerations are moving in the right direction, but they don’t get to the
heart of the matter. What we need is an explanation for the fact that pre-choice act
credences cannot be attached to the deliberative stool in the first place. We propose
that such an explanation—indeed, an explanation for EAT itself—can be found in
the cognitive phenomenon known as transparency. We turn to some key points from
Moran’s (2001) explication of this notion.17
5.2 Moran on transparency
Moran describes transparency like this:
Ordinarily, if a person asks himself the question “Do I believe that P?,” he will
treat this much as he would a corresponding question that does not refer to him
at all, namely, the question “Is P true?” And this is not how he will normally
16 Ismael (2012, p. 160) notes that Jonathan Bennett makes a similar point about the instability of predictions
about our own behaviour, while we deliberate. Price’s (1986a, 1991) defence of Evidential Decision Theory
relies on a similar instability argument, motivated by the Principle of Total Evidence. And Gaifman (1999)
highlights a similar phenomenon of instability in Bayesian decision and game theory through his analysis
of the Cassandra’s paradox.
17 We present Moran’s views at greater length in Liu and Price (2018). For another discussion of trans-
parency and its relevance to an understanding of the agent’s perspective, we recommend Ismael (2012).
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relate himself to the question of what someone else believes. Roy Edgley [1969]
has called this feature the “transparency” of one’s own thinking. (2001, §2.6)
He offers the following diagnosis of the phenomenon:
[W]hat … transparency requires is the deferral of the theoretical question “What
do I believe?” to the deliberative question “What am I to believe?” And in the
case of the attitude of belief, answering a deliberative question is a matter of
determining what is true. (62-3)
This diagnosis involves a distinction between two epistemic stances on one’s own
mind, a distinction that Moran describes like this:
In characterizing two sorts of questions one may direct toward one’s state of mind,
the term ‘deliberative’ is best seen at this point in contrast to ‘theoretical,’ the
primary point being to mark the difference between that inquiry which terminates
in a true description of my state, and one which terminates in the formation or
endorsement of an attitude. (63)
Moreover, Moran takes the lessons of transparency to apply equally to deliberation
about what to avow and deliberation about what to do. As he puts it:
[W]e might … compare the case of belief with that of knowledge of one’s own
future behavior: a person may have a purely predictive basis for knowing what
he will do, but in the normal situation of free action it is on the basis of his
decision that he knows what he is about to do. In deciding what to do, his gaze is
directed “outward,” on the considerations in favor of some course of action, on
what he has most reason to do. Thus his stance toward the question, “What am I
going to do now?” is transparent to a question about what he is to do, answered
by the “outward-looking” consideration of what is good, desirable, or feasible
to do. (105)
For action, as for belief, Moran emphasises that transparency does not mean that the
agent does not have knowledge of her own state of mind. The point is rather that that
knowledge comes from a distinctive source, only available in the first-person present-
tensed case—via a deliberative path, rather than a theoretical or empirical path, as
Moran puts it. The last passage continues:
When [the agent] answers this question [i.e., “What am I going to do now?”]
for himself and announces what he is going to do, … [w]hat he has gained, and
what his statement expresses, is straightforward knowledge about a particular
person [i.e., himself], knowledge that can be told and thus transferred to another
person who needs to know what he will do. (105–6)
Borrowing a term from our own context, we might characterise Moran’s conclusion
as being that from the first-person present-tensed perspective, the deliberative path
to knowledge crowds out the theoretical path (though the content of the knowledge
achieved is precisely the same).
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5.3 From transparency to evidential autonomy
Let us now apply these ideas to our own discussion. In the section before last we were
looking for a justification for the thesis (required by Joyce’s claim that “it is absurd
for an agent’s views about the advisability of performing any act to depend on how
likely she takes that act to be”) that a pre-deliberative act credence cannot be a reason
for the action in question. As we put it there, why can’t pre-deliberative act credences
support the deliberative stool?
Transparency gives us an answer. In effect, it implies that deliberation turns the
stool upside down. It makes our knowledge of what we will do rest on the deliberative
seat, and not vice versa. What is absurd about taking act credences to be reasons is
that during deliberation, deliberation itself is the source of one’s act credences. At this
point, trying to take an act credence to be a reason is simply putting the cart before
the horse—one needs one’s reasons in order to generate one’s act credences.18
More generally, Moran’s distinction between two paths to knowledge of ourselves—
the theoretical path and deliberative path—offers us a straightforward explanation of
EAT itself. EAT simply rests on the fact that when we embark on the deliberative path,
we set aside the theoretical path. That’s the core of transparency.
Indeed, this diagnosis suggests that Joyce’s own formulation of EAT is a little too
weak. As Joyce expresses it, EAT is this principle:
A deliberating agent who regards herself as free need not proportion her beliefs
about her own acts to the antecedent evidence that she has for thinking that she
will perform them. (2007, 557, emphasis added)
This suggests a picture in which the antecedent evidence is still sitting there, as it
were, but the agent simply has the option of ignoring it, in deciding to proportion her
beliefs about her own acts. Moran’s picture is more exclusive, and less voluntary. By
deliberating, we move ourselves out of the evidential space altogether. In particular,
the agent doesn’t have the option of not ignoring the evidence, because she is no longer
playing the evidential game, no longer following the theoretical path.
Once again, various terminological options present themselves at this point. Joyce
may prefer to say that the agent doesn’t leave evidential space altogether, but rather
enters a special kind of evidential space (one in which she calls the evidential shots,
so to speak). Again, we want to bracket these terminological issues, in order to focus
on the underlying structural bifurcation that seems agreed on all sides. This is that
deliberation involves a distinctive path to knowledge of our own present choices—a
path that takes precedence over, indeed ‘crowds out’, the theoretical path that we rely
on in third person and non-present-tensed cases.
This bifurcation, or separation between two paths to knowledge of our own actions,
is what transparency explains. (Indeed, if Moran is right, it is simply the special
practical case of something more general.) We propose that it is the source of EAT,
18 True, one might take the memory of a pre-deliberative credence to provide a reason—I’m doing it because
I predicted that I would, and I want to prove myself right. But here the reason is not the prior credence
itself, but the belief that one previously held that credence. We are mentioning the credence, not using it,
so to speak.
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and at the heart of what is correct about DCOP. As promised, Joyce turns out to be a
friend of this version of DCOP, once terminological differences are set to one side.19
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